Product Penetration Testing
Penetration testing of the software and infrastructure that form part of the product, web and mobile applications, APIs, cloud-native backends, Kubernetes, management interfaces and network services.
We follow attack paths across application, identity, backend and infrastructure boundaries rather than treating each component as an isolated test target.
One product. Multiple application and infrastructure boundaries.
Product security rarely stops at the frontend. Authentication decisions in an API can affect backend services. A compromised application account may expose management functions. Kubernetes identities and secrets can turn an application flaw into infrastructure access.
What we test
Applications
Web applications, mobile applications, management interfaces, privileged product functions and client-side trust assumptions.
APIs & authorization
Authentication, authorization, object access, privilege boundaries, business logic and management APIs.
Identity & session trust
Sessions, tokens, device/user identity, federation, service identities, role models and privilege transitions.
Backend services
Product services, internal APIs, message flows, service-to-service trust and backend business logic.
Kubernetes & cloud-native runtime
RBAC, service accounts, workload identity, namespace boundaries, exposed services and paths from application compromise into the runtime.
Secrets & network services
Credentials, tokens, secret exposure, management ports, network protocols and infrastructure services that form part of the product.
The exact assessment surface follows the product architecture. Not every engagement needs every layer.
The interesting findings often sit between components.
Application → API → Administration
A low-privilege application account reaches an API operation that exposes a management function intended only for administrators.
API → Identity → Backend
An authorization weakness allows access to another tenant or product instance. Backend trust turns a single API flaw into cross-customer impact.
Application → Kubernetes → Secrets
An application compromise reaches a workload identity with excessive permissions. The original application flaw becomes access to product secrets or internal services.
Scope follows the product architecture.
Architecture
Applications, APIs, backend services, identity systems, Kubernetes, network services and external dependencies relevant to the product.
Attacker assumptions
Unauthenticated user, authenticated customer, low-privilege account, compromised client, network access or another agreed starting position.
Technical depth
We select the attack paths and test methods needed to answer the actual product-security question rather than dividing the system into unrelated test packages.
A complete architecture package is not required before the first conversation.
What you get
Reproducible findings
Steps, requests, evidence and affected components sufficient for engineering teams to reproduce the issue.
Technical impact
What the weakness enables under the agreed attacker assumptions.
Attack-path context
How application, API, identity and infrastructure weaknesses combine across the product.
Remediation & retest
Technical remediation context and verification of fixes against the original attack path where retesting is in scope.
- ACCESS
- authenticated product user
- PATH
- API → backend service → workload identity → secrets
- IMPACT
- access to service credentials
- STATUS
- reproducible
When this assessment fits
Need the assessment to support a regulatory requirement?
Where required, assessment scope and findings can be mapped to relevant technical requirements from the CRA, EN 18031 and IEC 62443.
From finding to a provable attack path.
A pentest finding counts when it holds on the device: reproducible, with clear conditions and technical impact. For that, the device runs on our bench, its interfaces are attacked deliberately, and the firmware is analysed where its protection does not hold.
Our lab methodology matches the one described with service 01, deepened on the attack side. The details of what happens there are covered with service 01; what matters here is the standard: a finding is only reported once it holds up on the product.
Dr. Ewan Fleischmann
22+ years IT security · PhD cryptography · OSCP · OSCE · CISSP
Building a product that needs serious security testing?
Tell us what you're building, the current development stage and what you want tested. The scope follows from the product.